Challenges for Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Making in the Reformation Era

By

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This paper is devoted to analysis of the possible challenges of Indonesia’s foreign policy making in the reformation era. It discusses some significant developments, such as the Indonesia’s economic and political crises and globalisation, diplomatic issues on human rights, and new dimensions of security challenges. These challenges are assumed to have an important bearing the alternative futures for Indonesia and its foreign policy performance in the Reformation era

The Indonesia’s Economic and Political Crises and Globalisation

The crisis in Indonesia has taken on a dynamic of its own. What began as a currency crisis in the third quarter of 1997 rapidly turned into a deep financial crisis with wide-ranging economic and social impacts, and finally became a serious political crisis that exploded in May 1998, forcing President Soeharto to resign. Soeharto’s departure, however, did not resolve the crisis. Of the states afflicted by the Asian economic crisis, Indonesia was struck the hardest. The World Bank, in its Executive Summary of the 1998 Country Economic Memorandum, 16 July 1998, stated that “Indonesia is in deep crisis. A country that achieved decades of rapid growth, stability, and poverty reduction, is now near economic collapse… No country in recent history, let alone one the size of Indonesia, has ever suffered such a dramatic reversal of fortune.” The road to recovery will not be a short and easy one.

Although the general characteristics of the crisis were similar in the various crisis countries, the depth and duration of the economic crisis in Indonesia were arguably unique. The question is why the crisis has been so severe in Indonesia and why the recovery has been so slow.

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At this point it is worth asking whether globalisation is to blame for what happened in Indonesia. Some might argue that had Indonesia not gone so far in liberalising its economy, had it retained some basic elements of control such as limits on capital account transactions, the outcome of the crisis would have been different. They point out that those large countries that had maintained firm control over their economies, like China and India, were spared the fury of financial crisis. Only countries with open economies fell prey to the financial predators, and became victims of crisis, countries like Indonesia, Korea, Thailand, Brazil, Russia and even Hong Kong. The Malaysian government intervened before it was too late.

Some authors, like Kelly and Olds, for instance, suggested that the Asian financial crisis has fostered a heightened sense that globalisation implies the loss of the ability to effectively regulate national economies and the diminished influence of societies over their own destinies. They maintain that the roots of the crisis can be viewed not as a reflection of domestic regulatory imperfections, but as a consequence of the level of globalisation to which Asian economies have exposed themselves. In addition Bello said that the exposure of Asian economies to global capital flows inevitably left them vulnerable to the vagaries of the international financial system.

On the other hand, others argue that had Indonesia and those other ‘successful’ East Asian economies not deregulated and liberalised their economies, they would not have achieved such a phenomenal progress both in economic as well as social terms in the decade before the crisis. The argument is then that the benefits from globalisation over the past decade far exceed the harm caused by the financial crisis. It should also be noted that new benefits of globalisation come from technological change spurred by information technology. A very good example of this can be found in India where much ‘back office’ work (e.g., data processing) is conducted on the Internet for large Western firms. This has brought higher value jobs to the economy, which would not have been possible without globalisation.

The two arguments, representing differing schools of thought, have until today been fiercely debated. Furthermore, in terms of international relations, at least globalisation has created greater openness and increasing interdependency among nations. Not only are nations

are increasingly open to one another, but they are also increasingly dependent on one another. In this sense, all nations are in principle exposed to the impact of globalisation.\textsuperscript{7}

There is a difference, however, in the extent to which different nations are open to the impact of globalisation, and to which a nation is dependent on another. The difference is more marked in the case of advanced industrialised nations on the one hand and the less developed or developing nations on the other, which are more objects rather than subjects in the process of globalisation. Among the former category of nations, the interdependency is more symmetrical or less asymmetrical than between these nations on the one hand and the second category of nations on the other, often to the damage particularly of the interests of the latter.

In the case of Indonesia, the crisis has been the most severe because of a malfunctioning political system. It is therefore no small wonder that the monetary crisis has been immediately followed by a prolonged political crisis marked by social upheavals with seemingly no end in sight. The diversity of the country, not only in terms of its population with different religious, ethnic, and cultural orientations, but also in terms of its geography, Indonesia being the largest archipelago in the world, has made the crisis multi-dimensional in nature.

Moreover Indonesia’s present problems were not caused by policy decisions taken during the last decade on the liberalisation of the economy, but because policies were not changed in response to increasing globalisation. As the former Indonesian Minister for the Economy, Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti has stated that sustainable development has been overshadowed by globalisation, "the realities of globalisation will continue and Indonesia cannot stop them."\textsuperscript{8} Indeed, if globalisation is a fact of life, the question is not about "to accept" or "to reject". The problem for developing nations, like Indonesia, is not to oppose globalisation, which is impossible, but to make the best of it to strengthen their powers.


\textsuperscript{8}“Coping with globalisation,” \textit{The Jakarta Post}, 22 June 2002.
socially, economically, politically, and culturally by making those involve in globalisation accountable.

Thus, in time of uncertainty the domestic economic dimensions of Indonesia’s external relations will have to be tackled even more seriously, for example, aside from growing competition from China, Vietnam and India, protectionism remains strong in the three major markets: the United States, Europe and Japan. In addition, perennial issues pertaining to human rights, the environment, democratisation and free market policies will be insisted upon as Indonesia's export performance make further inroads into the interests of business and labour unions in advanced industrialised countries.

Paradoxically, as domestic social pressures to consolidate the economy become more imperative, the external political circumstances become even more consequential. For instance, the issue of international terrorism in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the U.S. has complicated Indonesia's attempts at economic recovery. A noted economist from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Mari Elka Pangestu, said international terrorism had become a key issue the government had to consider in its attempts to attract foreign investment. Pangestu pointed out that even before 11 September 2001, the government was aware that political stability, transparent governance, a consistent economic policy and good infrastructure were concerns of foreign investors.⁹

It is obvious that the phenomenon is a contemporary one which resulted from the impact of globalisation in terms of international political and economic relations.¹⁰ Furthermore, changes in the global economy have a major effect on national economies and social stability. These and other factors combine to pose economic and social risks with direct political consequences on both state and society as a whole and hence on domestic stability and international margin of manoeuvre, quite separate from acute crises.¹¹

If it is believed that the current crisis situation in Indonesia has more economic character, it seems that the Yudhoyono government should have more focus on foreign economic policy rather than foreign political policy. Indonesia’s foreign policy should be directed to accelerate the domestic economic recovery process. If so, it should be a review regarding basic role and position of Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in implementing Indonesian

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¹¹ Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, “Dampak Krisis Ekonomi terhadap Keutuhan ASEAN sebagai Lembaga Kerjasama
foreign policy. DFA should have an open minded position to the involvement of other components out of DFA in both in formulation and implementing Indonesia’s foreign economic policies.

Considering Indonesia's struggle to recover from the devastation of the Asian financial crisis, The Indonesian government has to focus on economic diplomacy, seeking new markets and new economic partners while enhancing current economic and trade relations. The Indonesian government should continue to engage in negotiations in the field of development cooperation, trade and science and technology and to hold meetings that increase its economic cooperation with various countries.

**Diplomatic Issues: Human Rights**

The problem of human rights will become more prominent and their impact on foreign policy cannot be ignored. Human rights issues have been globalised and therefore it would be difficult to insulate Indonesia from these concerns. These issues will continue to influence the implementation of Indonesia’s foreign policy in the future.¹²

The United Nations has taken the first step in 1948 toward committing all governments to human rights by formulating internationally defined norms. These standards form the grounding in which the study of human rights should be rooted.¹³ Human rights as enshrined in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights are universal. The UN Charter enjoins all countries to promote and protect human rights within the context of international cooperation.

These conventions and understandings recognise that human rights come in several categories. There are economic, social and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights. Furthermore, these individual rights are balanced by the individual’s corresponding obligations to the community, society or the nation which nurtures him and makes it possible for him to enjoy his individual rights. All categories of human rights form an indivisible whole, none promoted at the expense of others.


It is also a generally accepted principle that while human rights are indeed universal in nature, their promotion and protection within any given country should remain the responsibility of the national government. This means that the implementation of human rights cannot be uniform throughout the world, considering the diversity of value systems, historical experiences, levels of economic development and other factors among different countries of the world.

Although Indonesia is a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in fact, Indonesia is one of the countries that have proposed a review of the Declaration on grounds that the Declaration was drafted particularly by the great (Western) powers, when many of the developing nations of today were not yet independent and therefore did not participate in drafting the document.\textsuperscript{14} Former President Soeharto has argued, for instance, that the Western concept is individualistic in nature and overlooks the rights of the society, the nation, and the state, whereas every individual is born in a society. Human rights cannot be separated from social responsibility.\textsuperscript{15} Therefore the political format of the New Order had emphasised the primacy of Indonesian culture to achieve economic development and political stability.\textsuperscript{16} As a consequence, the state was stronger than society as politics changed the nature of linkages between domestic politics and foreign policy.

However, in the world of today which is increasingly open, interdependent and interlinked, some of what are normally called “domestic affairs” of a country are increasingly difficult to avoid external inference, especially if such cases are the common concern of the humankind or humanity. In cases where human rights are violated, appropriate pressure may need to be brought to bear by the international community, for example, Indonesia has experienced external influence in its management of human rights, in the form of the UN action in East Timor.

Therefore, to enforce human rights is one of the main programs in the Reformation Era. Previous doubts about the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a “Western” document are no longer voiced by the present leaders. In compliance with the development and fast change in international constellation after the cold war, and on the basis of proposals which were gathered from various segments of Indonesian society, the Interdepartmental Standing


\textsuperscript{16} Rizal Sukma, “Values, Governance, and Indonesia's Foreign Policy”, in Sung-joon Han, ed., \textit{Changing Values in Asia: Their Impact on Governance and Development}. Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Nations and
Committee established by the Indonesian Government in 1991. This Committee works with the National Commission on Human Rights (Komisi Nasional Hak Azasi Manusia, KOMNAS HAM) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the focal-point. The cooperation among the three institutions eventually succeeded in drafting a National Plan of Action on Human Rights (Rencana Aksi Nasional Hak Azasi Manusia, RAN-HAM) was then officially launched on 25 June 1998 by President Habibie through Presidential Decree No. 129 on August 15, 1998. The launching also coincide with the commemoration of the fifth anniversary of Vienna Declaration and Program of Action 1993.

The National Committee of RAN-HAM was formed to carry out the RAN-HAM programs. The RAN-HAM consists of concrete steps on the promotion and protection of human rights to be taken at national level during period of 1998-2003. It should be re-evaluated regularly to ensure its comprehensive implementation, the sustained enforcement of laws on human rights, as well as social justice and civility in Indonesian society.

The substance of the National Plan of Action is borne by four pillars: first, the ratification of international human rights instruments; second the dissemination of information and the conduct of social education on human rights; third, measures to address human rights priority issues, aimed at invigorating the efforts to promote and protect the human rights of the Indonesian people, in particular the segments of community that are most vulnerable to human rights violations; and fourth, implementation of ratified human rights conventions.

According to the National Plan of Action, activities with regard to the process of ratification include, among others, determining the order of priority in the ratification, conducting studies on conventions, drafting the bill of ratification, translating conventions and disseminating of ratified conventions. These are followed by harmonising domestic laws and fulfilling reporting obligations covering activities on the compilation and presentation of the report as well as translating and disseminating the manual of standard UN reporting. During the first year, activities scheduled should accelerate ratification of Protocol I and II of the Geneva Conventions and a number of ILO Conventions.

In area for dissemination, education and implementation of ratified conventions, the National Plan of Action (NPA) has set up a series of activities ranging from the establishment of study centres on human rights in some Universities in several provinces in Indonesia. The NPA has also organised symposia at local, national and regional level to share experiences on

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the promotion and protection of human rights education, education and training for law enforcement officials, drafting human rights syllabi for primary, secondary and tertiary school, formulating human rights material for the community which are easy to understand, strengthening participation of certain groups an NGOs family reinforcement, research, evaluation and monitoring, social mobilisation, legal reform administrative measures and law enforcement up to making use of the existing traditional media. Considering that the process of ratifying international human rights instruments requires considerable time and intensive thought, the effort to promote and protect human rights in Indonesia should be carried out even before the process of ratification is completed.

Under the National Plan of Action, Indonesia has ratified a number of international human rights conventions and conducted quite a number of activities and programmes including dissemination of international standards instrument on human rights, training for trainers and enacting laws related to the promotion and protection of human rights.

In its efforts to accelerate the progress of the implementation of the National Plan of Action, the Indonesian Government has also developed close cooperation with the Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva by signing an MOU on 4 March 1999. This kind of cooperation has resulted among other, a series of workshops on human rights reporting system with the emphasis on the six core human rights conventions.

During the period of the National Plan of Action on Human Rights 1998-2003, Indonesia has so far ratified the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ILO's Convention No. 105 (Abolition of Forced Labour), No. 111 (Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation), No. 138 (Minimum Age for Admission to Employment) and No. 182 (Worst Form of Child Labour). The Government of Indonesia is now in the process of ratifying some other conventions including International Covenant on Economic, Social and Culture Rights and Protocol II of the Geneva Convention 1949. Other achievement in the field of human rights are the enactment of the People's Consultative Assembly's Decree of 1998 on Human Rights and the Law No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights. At the same time the Indonesian government has taken some steps to harmonise national laws with these conventions as well as fulfilled reporting obligations with regard to their implementation.

A nation in promoting and protecting human rights will not be sufficient only by ratifying international conventions and harmonising national law. The Plan of Action also
provides a clear direction for the establishment of a national human rights culture through a conscious efforts to develop, nurture and raise of awareness and knowledge of all members of society on human rights issues. It is hoped that community knowledge on human rights can be developed, fostered and raised through education at a various levels, sectors, areas and time.

In short, although national government remains primarily responsible for the promotion and protection of human rights at national level, the National Plan of Action is not exclusively the domain of the government. The National Plan of Action provides an ample opportunity to the Indonesian community as well as international cooperation on a bilateral basis or through multilateral agencies as written in the Article 3 paragraph 1 of the Charter of the United Nations which states the need to achieve international co-operation in promoting and protecting human rights., to contribute their participation in implementing series of activities which already being set out in the Plan of Actions.

In fact Indonesia has enhanced bilateral and multilateral cooperation, including that with the office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the latest being advisory to the administration of justice, notability assistance in setting up human rights courts. In this respect, for example, former President Abdurahman Wahid on 23 April 2001, enacted Presidential Decree No.53/2001 for the establishment of an ad hoc human rights court to adjudicate on the documented cases of gross violations of human rights in East Timor in 1999 and in Tanjung Priok in 1984. The establishment of the ad hoc human rights court is based on the proposal put forward on 21 March 2001 by the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) as mandated by Law No.26/2000, on the establishment of human rights courts.

The Indonesian Government has followed up on the findings submitted by the Human Rights Investigative Committee (known as KPPHAM) of the Indonesian National Committee on Human Rights on the violations of human rights which took place in East Timor in 1999. In October 2000, the Attorney General's Office named 23 individuals suspected of involvement in the first five documented cases of human rights violations arising from the 6 April 1999 massacre in Liquisa, the 17 April 1999 killings at independence leader Manuel Carrascalao’s house, the 5 September 1999 attack on the compound of the Catholic Diocese in Dilli, the 6 September 1999 massacre of priests and displaced persons at a church in Suai, and the 21 September 1999 killing of Dutch journalist Sander Thoenes.
Following another report submitted by the National Commission on Human Rights in July 2000, the Attorney General's Office has also been investigating human rights violations which took place in the 1984 Tanjung Priok incident.

The establishment of the ad hoc human rights court reflects the determination of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia to address past human rights abuses, including in East Timor, thereby contributing to the advancement of the human rights cause in Indonesia in general and to the promotion of reconciliation between Indonesia and East Timor.

It seems that for the foreseeable future the Indonesian government needs to put a high premium on international cooperation and practical approaches to promote human rights. Considering that Indonesia, in spite of its many problems, is now ranked among the world's democracies, Indonesia’s commitment to the promotion of civil and human rights and to far reaching reforms in governance would be well appreciated in the international community.

New Dimensions of Security Challenges

An extraordinary consensus has developed throughout the Asia Pacific region, among both policy-makers and independent strategic analysts, over the past several years, with respect to the character of the post-Cold War regional security environment and emergent regional security concerns.\(^\text{17}\)

In fact, the complexity of international politics and security in the Asia Pacific region has persuaded regional leaders to review the conventional concepts of foreign policy and security.\(^\text{18}\) Leaders are confronted with the reality of the Post-Cold War world which produced two dimensions of security considerations, i.e. multilateralism and multi-aspects.\(^\text{19}\)


\(^\text{18}\) There are several factors which in concert help determine the nature of any country’s strategic environment, the context in which it must conduct its security policies. These include: enduring factors (mostly geographic, but including the often-cited uncertainty factor), economic factors, and technology issues, including access and ability to support technologies. See See Gary Brown, Gary, *Military Threats versus Security Problems: Australia’s Emerging Strategic Environment*, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group, vol. no. 1 (1999/2000).


\(^\text{19}\) CPF Luhulima, *Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy in Southeast Asia*, a paper presented at Caraka Utama Training and Education, Department of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia, Jakarta, 28 September 1999, p.1.
Multilateral organisations in Asia were born during a period of great geo-political change. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in combination with the U.S. departure from its bases in the Philippines provoked considerable uneasiness within Asia on the future of regional security in the post-Cold War environment. The result was a proliferation in the early 1990s of official and unofficial multilateral security dialogues intended to address the imperatives of a new multi-polar world. Academics and scholars were the driving force behind many of the first dialogues, including the Council on Security Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific or CSCAP, established in Kuala Lumpur in June 1993, and the Northeast Asia Co-operation Dialogue or NEACD, established in California later that year.

The most important of the organisations to emerge from this ferment was the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In 1993, the Clinton Administration reversed previous policy of hostility to multilateralism and joined with ASEAN as a founding member of the ARF, the first region-wide consultative body in Asia focused on security issues. The great variety of actors in the region and the great number of strains and conflicts created the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to provide the region with an institution to absorb multilateral dialogues on security and to develop further the concepts of confidence building, preventive diplomacy and finding ways to resolve regional tensions and conflicts towards developing instruments for conflict resolution in the region.

The other reality of the Post-Cold War world is the multi-faceted aspects of security. The complexity of developments in the Asia Pacific region has produced new disturbances and threats, beyond the conventional field of foreign policy and security. It is this complexity that created the need to multi-aspects the concept of security, comprising those aspects of security against narcotics traffic, international crime, formerly dubbed low intensity threats, and increasingly against environmental degradation, bio-diversity loss, emerging diseases, overpopulation, and political unrest as a consequence of these new kind of threats.

Furthermore, in its annual report for 1993 and 1994 the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) noted that there was a need for a new security concept: “The concept of security must change – from an exclusive stress on national security to a much greater stress on people’s security, from security through armaments to security through human

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20 The ARF met for the first time in Bangkok in July 1994. The current participants in the ARF are as follows: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, European Union, Republic of Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Mongolia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Russian Federation, Singapore, Thailand, United States, Vietnam.
development, from territorial security to food, employment, and environmental security.\textsuperscript{21} The report of the UNDP the following years was to have a great impact on the international discussion about security.

What the UNDP articulated was an alternative way of looking upon security, shifting the focus of security from national security, that is the security of the states, to human security, namely the security of people, which includes both individuals and communities. The UN Human Development Report 1994 defined human security as to include “safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and repression as well as protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the pattern of daily life.”\textsuperscript{22} Later the concept was expanded to include economic, health and environmental concerns as well as physical security of the individual.\textsuperscript{23}

During the following years this alternative security concept gained wider acceptance. Human security became “something of a catch-phrase, used both by the United Nations agencies, national development aid agencies and international as well as national Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).\textsuperscript{24}

According to Mahbub ul Haq, who was the original author of the 1994 UNDP report, human security is a universal, global, and indivisible concern that deals with:

- Security of people, not just security of territory,
- Security of individuals, not just security of their nations,
- Security through development, not security through arms,
- Security of all people everywhere – in their homes, in their jobs, in their streets, in their communities, in their environment.\textsuperscript{25}

From ul Haq’s attempt to pin down the meaning of human security it is easy to grasp that it is multi-layered concept, with security having to be considered from the level of the state down to that of the individual. The primary focus is on people, the human being. Security has expanded “to include the personal well-being of individuals and their ability to feel secure in the basic needs that affect their day-to-day existence… Using the human security label is a

sign that governments have begun to recognise the importance of the well-being of citizens as well as the security of the state and the nation”.

Advocates of human security tend to be dismissive of old concepts of “geo-politics” and “nation-state” and stress the need to confront and resolve challenges created by the changing nature of the state system rather than on armed conflict, power balancing etc. In today’s world, state fragmentation is intensifying along socio-ethnic lines along with an increase in complex humanitarian emergencies such as happened in Kosovo and East Timor. Hence a new emphasis on ‘societal security’ is demanding greater attention from policy makers. The present day conflicts are increasingly about defending ethnic and religious groups and salvaging the remnants of civilised life after natural disasters and intervention in inter state disputes with peace keeping missions. International politics is increasingly being conducted at diverse levels of international society, not exclusively by the state. The emerging international society integrates communications, cultures and economies in ways that transcend state centric relations.

Globalisation has precipitated threats to traditional institutions such as the nuclear family, religious groups and labour unions having devastating effects in developing nations where governments are often overwhelmed by the costs, technological barriers and social cleavages impeding their ability to provide even the basic necessities. The formation of more comprehensive security regimes and communities is required to meet the challenge.

The widening gap between the emergent interdependence (courtesy globalisation) in civil society, public order, economics, ecology, culture and human rights on the one hand and the legal/political structure of the nation-state system on the other, has exposed the inadequacy of the traditional security paradigm for generating an international consensus on order, security and justice. The search for an answer has now centred on issues that address human security concerns. In the address to the 54th Session of the UNGA, The former United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, insisted that the international community should define the

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best way to address the issues of human security and intervention in the next century, in the
light of dramatic development with regard to the growing intensity of conflicts in the world.

Kofi Annan reveals that State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined, and
that States have an obligation to enhance individual sovereignty, which translates into the
promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms of each and every individual. It is in
this light that there should be a renewed consciousness of the right of every individual to
control his or her own destiny Kofi Annan assumes that strict traditional notions of
sovereignty can no longer do justice to the aspirations of peoples everywhere to attain their
fundamental freedoms. At the same time a new and more widely conceived definition of
national interests would induce States to find greater unity in the pursuit of such basic
principles of the UN Charter like democracy, pluralism, human rights and the rule of law.
Kofi Annan further states that the spirit of collective conscience of humanity is in fact the
national interest which every State should uphold and he goes on saying that the UNSC’s
decision in authorizing a multinational force for East Timor reflected precisely the purpose of
humanitarian action to bringing peace and security in the territory.29

Concerning Indonesia, it should adequately respond to the political, human rights and
humanitarian crises affecting the world today. In fact, Former Indonesian Minister for
Foreign Affairs Ali Alatas has even said that Indonesia fully agreed that massive and
systematic violation of human rights--wherever they may take place--should not be tolerated.
Alatas added that “Indonesia could not agree that this problem could only be solved by
sacrificing the principle of national sovereignty and sovereign equality among nations. There
must be a solution that does not threaten to demolish a principle on which the United Nations
itself was founded”.30

However, in my opinion, the Indonesian government should realise that today human
security issues strike directly at the individual, largely ignoring state boundaries and requiring
action and cooperation at different levels- global, regional and local- if they are to be tackled
effectively. Human security means the freedom to attain one’s capacity and opportunity to
enjoy the most out of life, without disturbing the right of others to obtain the same security.
Human security seeks to enhance the people’s quality of lives. To achieve this end, issues of

29 Kofi Annan, “Two Concepts of Sovereignty”, Address to the 54th Session of the UNGA, New York, 20
September 1999.
30 Statement by H.E. Mr. Ali Alatas, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia at the 54th
Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, 23 September 1999.
good governance, the economic system, and environmental policy are issues that Indonesia should include as part of its foreign policy agenda in the future.

One immediate implication of today’s security threats for Indonesia is the common perception that an alternative framework for thinking about security that encompasses the transnational agenda is required. A complex multi-centric world has emerged. This world consists of various non-state actors such as multinational corporations, ethnic minorities, subnational governments, professional societies, social movements, non-governmental organisations, political parties, and individual actors.

Another implication is that a transformation of the policymaking process is needed to deal with this complex issue. The threats and crises in the years ahead seem much more likely to be diverse in source, nature, and scale. These threats stem from demographic pressures, resource depletion, global warming, unregulated population movements, transnational crime and virulent new strains of infectious diseases, and many others not previously associated with international security, especially regarding global war against terrorism.

**Indonesia and Terrorism**

Today the global campaign against terrorism symbolises a much larger trend, that is the emerging tendency of nation-states to turn their focus to transnational security threats.\(^31\) It is for that reason that Indonesia has actively participated in various fora in combating transnational crimes, including people smuggling, corruption, drugs, terrorism, and money laundering.

Admittedly, the Western assumptions over terrorism in Indonesia are so far exclusively related with increased activities of several radical Islamic movements such as *Front Pembela Islam* (Islamic Defender Front), Laskar Jihad, the *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia-MMU* (the Indonesian Mujahideen Council, which is accused of having a strong link with the Jamaah Islamiyah cells), and the *Jama'ah al-Ikhwan al Muslimeen Indonesia (JAMI)*, as well as a number of other small groups, which made their appearance since the interregnum of President Habibie. It was said that these groups have close connections with the Al-Qaeda cells.\(^32\)

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32 Azyumardi Azra, “Kelompok Radikal Muslim (Radical Muslim Groups),” Tempo, 1 June 2003, p.52.
Many of the challenges confronting transnational security threats could be reduced if the government were to reorient its thinking and operations and decentralise its decision making process. This reorientation can be conducted by using three methods.

Firstly, the government should continue to define security as a multi-dimensional concept that requires a firm inter-agency cooperation. A case in point is the debate about the possible engagement of the Indonesian Military (TNI) to address transnational threats.

Proponents for military deployment argue that transnational security threats are the major security challenges to the nation-state in the next decades. On the other hand, military involvement would detract the military from its fundamental role of defending the nation from external attacks and would create a financial drain to military budgets.

The point of agreement of this debate could be a call for the government to designate a particular division of its military forces to deal specifically with transnational security threats. Or Indonesia could create units within civilian agencies that might even have military training to acquire specific skills to deal with transnational threats.

The second method is decentralisation. Although the inner circle will continue to design the national security strategy, the responsibility for its conduct could be decentralised. The inner circle could concentrate its attention on major potential crises that pose direct and immediate threats to global and national security.

Direct attacks on Indonesian territory, interstate aggression, a regional arms race, and humanitarian crises are examples of issues that would be the areas for inner circle concern. Lower bureaucratic levels then could both undertake early warning tasks and oversee preventive responses in local arenas.

The third method is that Indonesia's security strategy should recognise the importance of adopting a more multilateral approach, for example, Indonesia needs to try to provide a counter-balance to the pre-emptive doctrine of U.S. President George W. Bush. This counter-balance is the introduction of a global preventive regime, which would comprise the United Nations system, regional organisations, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

Indonesia cannot handle transnational security challenges alone and as such, international cooperation had become more important than ever. Before taking this step, Indonesia should first seek to gain support for the initiative from other major powers, who should exercise their leadership by providing resources to multilateral organisations and NGOs on the front lines of prevention, providing diplomatic support behind particular
preventive efforts, and providing experienced individual representatives to mediate incipient disputes under multilateral auspices.

Yet, in the end, the Indonesian government must put its house in order and increase its decisiveness and effective control over the domestic and transnational activities of many radical groups-regardless their religious backgrounds, without violating the basic rules of democracy and human rights, whereas the public, especially the majority of moderate Muslims, must rectify the common misperception in the West. Indonesian Islam is not in favour of terrorism. President Yudhoyono must be made sure that she receives full support from the majority of Indonesian Muslims in taking more decisive action against any radicalism to avoid a deteriorating image of Indonesia-and Indonesian Islam in the eyes of the international society.

All of the above possible challenges for Indonesia are assumed to have an important bearing on the alternative futures for Indonesia and its foreign policy performance in the Reformation era, especially for the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono government or its successor in the immediate years ahead.

Alternative Futures for Indonesia and Its Foreign Policy Performance

The direction of future trends of Indonesia’s foreign policy in the period of Yudhoyono government or its successor in the immediate years ahead depend upon past events, critical uncertainties and potentially a range of unknown influences - the possibility of events which cannot be predicted at all. In this regard, an assessment of trends is shaped by two factors: the form of government (authoritarian and democracy) and indicators inherent in each projection.

In terms of form of the government there are four options, namely:

- **Stable Democracy.** Such a state would have found its political equilibrium and, based on the ‘democratic peace hypothesis’ would not be expected to initiate military conflict, except in clear cases of self-defence or with the legitimacy of a United Nations resolution.
- **Unstable Democracy.** A state which is vulnerable to internal conflict or coup.

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33 On the model of authoritarian there is a high degree of influence concentration (hierarchical – perfect ordering, strictly top down function). In hierarchical situations, one powerful man (president) dominates the rest. On the contrary, under democratic model there is a relatively lower degree of influence concentration in which every institution has an equal rights depends on the function, none of them dominates the other. See Raymond F. Hopkins and Richard W. Mansbach, *Structure and Process in International Politics*. London,
• **Stable Authoritarian.** This could either be an absolute monarchy (e.g. Brunei) or a state with a repressive regime such as North Korea. Though such a state has found a political equilibrium, questions of duration and succession arise. Repressive stable authoritarian states tend to use military force to sustain their power base – e.g. China.

• **Unstable Authoritarian.** Such a state is of greatest immediate concern from an international security viewpoint. On the one hand it has the potential to fragment possibly with a violent civil war, for example, the former Yugoslavia. Such a regime might attempt military aggression as a means of generating nationalism and unity, for example, Argentina in 1982.

Moreover, indicators can be envisaged in respect of both what we know and what we do not know (critical uncertainties) about the likely future of a state. For example, it is well known that Indonesia is in a recession, but its duration or extent is not known; in the case of Indonesia, further economic downturns could be associated with a trend towards less stable government, whereas continued pursuit of the proposed political reforms can be associated with democratisation. Therefore it is a must to allow for the range of possibilities between an early economic recovery and severe long-term depression, noting that the various potential economic outcomes can be linked generally with the different trends which have been postulated.

Thus, the indicators are very much indicative rather than definitive. Some of the indicators which will alert us to what outcomes might be developing can be identified. These indicators might usefully provide a policy basis for Indonesia’s activities in attempting to respond to regional developments and to shape the strategic environment towards its most favoured outcome.

Based on the above two considerations (form of the government and indicators), the apparent alternatives for Indonesia would appear to be as follows:

**Alternative 1 – Stable Democracy**

• **Features:**

Political, social, legal and economic reform measures and peace initiatives in disputed provinces take effect, promoting a return of economic confidence.
• **Indicative Outcome:**
  Stable democratic political structures achieved and restoration of (initially modest?)
  economic growth.

• **Indicators:**
  Good progress by Yudhoyono’s government in implementing promised democratic
  reforms are a good basis on which this can be built;
  Absence of substantial riots; TNI continues to show a high level of restraint;
  Completion of TNI combat troops withdrawal from disputed provinces; Growth of
  international economic support – especially from USA, IMF, World Bank etc;
  Return of ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs and financiers;
  Positive response to ‘peace initiatives’ in disputed provinces.

• **Implication for Foreign Policy**
  Indonesia’s foreign policy appears increasingly the product of a rational response to
  internal and external demands. The Indonesian government undertakes a series of
  domestic measures and foreign policy decisions which fundamentally alter its orientation
  toward the outside world.
  Indonesia’s foreign policy objectives are directed to mobilise international resources to
  assist in the country’s economic rehabilitation and development, and to ensure a secure
  regional environment which would allow Indonesia to concentrate on its domestic agenda.

**Alternative 2 – Unstable Democracy**

• **Features:**
  Good progress made on democratic reform measures and peace initiatives in disputed
  provinces, but effects of recession prove dominant.

• **Indicative Outcome:**
  A more democratic form of government achieved, but domestic social stability
  undermined by continuing economic recession. Reduced government ability to exercise
  rule of law, increase in ‘economic refugees.’ Potential for political breakdown and thus
  regression to authoritarian, military backed government in the medium to longer term.

• **Indicators:**
  Good progress by Yudhoyono government implementing promised democratic reforms;
  Positive response to ‘peace initiatives’ in disputed provinces;
  Continued recession which generates ‘food riots’ and large refugee flows;
Ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs reluctant to return;  
Lack of external economic investment;  
Loss of international banking and monetary support.

- Implication for Foreign Policy  
Indonesia’s foreign policy is based on the assumption that Indonesia needs international support and assistance, particularly to ensure its territorial integrity, sustain economic recovery and help a democratic consolidation.

**Alternative 3 – Stable Authoritarian**

- Features:
  Government uses further insurrection (food riots, refugee flows etc.) as an excuse to divert from political reform, but continues to seek peaceful solutions in the disputed provinces.

- Indicative Outcome:
  Indonesia remains a guided democracy, becoming more authoritarian than before. A hard government line in practice would be softened superficially to appease external interests. The economy would stabilize in line with a general Asian economic recovery.

- Indicators:
  Use of political resistance to justify more authoritarian measures by government;  
  TNI suppression of riots etc. is conducted by a firm but measured application of force;  
  Removal of TNI combat troops from disputed provinces leads to a relaxation of tension, accompanied by peaceful negotiations on a compromise solution;  
  Return of some ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs in response to restored social stability;  
  Provision of some external economic support from international banking and monetary institutions.

- Implication for Foreign Policy
  The effectiveness of initiatives and the formulation of foreign policy depend on the President’s personal leadership style, political experience and greater appreciation of overall foreign policy situations.

**Alternative 4 – Unstable Authoritarian**

- Features:
  Continuing recession leads to insurrection which necessitates continuous use of TNI to maintain law and order. TNI action may involve excessive force and human rights
violations. The government is stretched to cope and thus forced to concede to demands such as granting autonomy/independence to one or more disputed provinces. Indonesian government policies are poorly received by the world community.

- **Indicative Outcome:**
  Indonesia is fractured politically, the economy regresses to a stagnant low income level, with 50 per cent or more of the population below the poverty level. Disputed provinces and possibly other remote areas break away either to become independent states, autonomous regions or to seek a merger with neighbouring states. Continuing economic recession leads to breakdown of TNI solidarity causing political infighting.

- **Indicators:**
  - Food riots and looting;
  - Insurrection/resistance in disputed provinces;
  - Political riots;
  - Harsh TNI intervention on a continuous basis;
  - International condemnation of Indonesian government/military actions;
  - Refugee outflows;
  - Chinese entrepreneurs consolidate in their new overseas locations;
  - Some form of belligerence by Indonesia towards its neighbours.

- **Implication for Foreign Policy**
  The Indonesian government drastically reduces its external contacts and imposes a variety of measures which are designed to end external penetration into Indonesian society, economics, and politics. Foreign investors, donors are persuaded to stay away.
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